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Abstract 
The recent financial crisis had serious worldwide impacts. Initial resilience and good past 
performances led to the illusion that the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region was 
able to decouple from developments in advanced economies. This initial illusion was 
however immediately denied since the crisis spread to that region just with a lag. The 
CEE region was, in fact, suddenly placed at the epicenter of the emerging market crisis. 
Further, the consequences of the crisis were not uniform among countries of the CEE 
region. Strong cross-country disparities in the resistance and recovery capacities have 
been observed.  Focusing on a CEE sub-region, the Central Europe and the Baltics (CEB), 
our research project aims to analyze and disentangle the resilience performance to the 
2008 financial crisis within countries of this region according to their shock isolation and 
absorptive capacities. 
We develop a new methodology to investigate two important dimensions of resilience, 
namely recovery and resistance. The latter can be defined as the relative vulnerability or 
sensitivity of economies within CEB region to disturbances and disruptions, whereas the 
former is the speed and extent of recovery from such a disruption or recession. Our 
methodology is based on Bayesian estimation techniques for general equilibrium models. 
We build and estimate a DSGE model for a small-open economy, which features nominal 
wage and price rigidities, as well as financial frictions in the form of liquidity-constrained 
households and limited access to deposits for the bank system. Then we group our 
parameter estimates in two sets: structural parameters and stochastic structure. The 
former individuates the deep parameters affecting the economic recovery capacities 
after stochastic disturbances (innovations) occur; the latter governs the innovation 
distributions and their intrinsic persistence. Accordingly, we study the relative differences 
across CEB economies using Principal Component Analysis (PCA), obtaining synthetic 
orthogonal indexes of these differences in a parsimonious way. Finally, we use the two 
sets to compare the relative recovery (resistance) country performances of a single 
country to those of a hypothetical economy characterized by a CEB average structural 
(stochastic) set of estimated parameters. Precisely, considering estimated parameters as 
variables of a cross-sectional dataset organized by country, we first look at national 
differences considering as reference a hypothetical country, where there are no 
distortions and/or unaffected by disturbances; second we use, as reference, a 
hypothetical average country, built on the estimated parameter means. 
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1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis had a serious impact on mature and emerging economies. The 
consequences were not uniform. Europe was characterized by strong cross-country 
differences in the resistance and recovery capacities. The economic decline was more 
intense in the countries at the periphery of the European Union and in those with fragile 
public finances. Initially, the crisis only marginally affected the Central and Eastern 
European region, which had previously observed high growth rates. The past good 
performance and the initial resilience led to claims that the region had “decoupled” from 
developments in advanced economies. However, the decoupling hypothesis was an 
illusion, the crisis spread to the CEE region just with a lag. After the Lehman Brothers 
crack, in fact, the CEE region was suddenly placed at the epicenter of the emerging 
market crisis (Roaf et al., 2014).1  
Our aim is to analyze and disentangle the resilience to the financial crisis within the CEE 
region. Specifically, we focus on CEB region. Although CEE transition countries have 
reached remarkable progress in the past quarter century, strongly converging to the 
West Europe, their relative status has changed over time and exhibited relevant 
differences. Roaf et al. (2014) showed that Europe remained divided along “traditional” 
and historical west-east lines, with advanced countries on one side and transition 
countries on the other. However, they also observe a more rapid progress in Central 
Europe and the Baltics than in Southeast Europe and the CIS and note that those 
countries are more close to the Mediterranean ones than other CEE economies. 2 They 
finally stressed that CEE emerging economies should be thus clustered into two regions, 
one closer to the integration with the continent and another farther.  
Even within Central Europe and the Baltics, the impact of the crisis on economic activity 
has varied widely across countries, reflecting differences in exposure and vulnerability to 
the financial shocks as well as heterogeneity in policy responses. We plan to measure 
and explain the disparities in the resistance and recovery capacities of CEB economies by 
estimating and simulating medium–scale DSGE models. Specifically, our objective is to 
measure two dimensions of the regional resilience, namely resistance and recovery. The 
former is the vulnerability or sensitivity of a regional economy to disturbances and 
disruptions. The latter is the speed and extent of recovery from such a disruption or 
recession (Martin, 2012). 
We built a small-open economy model for distinct Central Europe and Baltic economies 
and estimate it by Bayesian techniques. The model features standard nominal wage and 
price rigidities, and financial frictions. Financial frictions assume the forms of liquidity–
constrained households and limited access to the deposits for the bank system. The 
financial accelerator of external shocks operates on the relationships between savers and 
banks featured by asymmetric information. An agency problem introduces endogenous 
constraints on the leverage ratios. Then, credit flows are tied to the equity capital of 
intermediaries. A financial crisis deteriorates intermediary capital and raises credit costs, 
lowering lending and borrowing (Gertler and Karadi, 2011). 
Once estimated, we first investigate the differences of estimated parameters across 
countries populating CEB region by using the principal component analysis (PCA). 
Considering estimated parameters as variables of a cross-sectional dataset organized by 
country, we reduce its dimensionality focusing on correlated variables retaining as much 
as possible of its variability. Specifically, PCA searches for a few uncorrelated linear 
combinations (principal components) of the original variables that capture most of the 
information in the original variables (cf. Di Bartolomeo and Marchetti, 2004). We focus 
                                           
1 Comparing the performances of 183 economies, Didier et al. (2012) also claim against the decoupling hypothesis with reference to 
emerging economies and their resilience. 
2 After the global and euro zone crises, the Central Europe and Baltic region has more in common with the EU15 countries (and 
within them, the Southern Europe subgroup) than it does with former Comecon partners to the east (Roaf et al., 2014: 56). 
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on two cases. In the first we look at the difference using as reference a hypothetical 
country where there are no distortions and/or unaffected by disturbances (non-centered 
PCA). In the second, as reference we use a hypothetical average country, built on the 
estimated parameter means (centered PCA). 
Finally, we use our Bayesian estimations to compute two measures of resilience to 
financial frictions. First, we look at the different stochastic structure estimated, the 
estimated standard deviations of the financial shocks and their auto–correlation give us 
a measure of the different vulnerability (or sensitivity) of Central Europe emerging 
markets. Second, we impose to all the countries within the Central Europe region a 
common stochastic structure and use simulations to derive a measure of their different 
recovery capacities. Then we investigate the effects of a financial crisis, exploring the 
role played by country differences in the relative performances. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. 
1. By using our Bayesian estimations and non-centered PCA analysis, we construct
two measures of resilience, in terms of resistance and recovery.  CEB countries
exhibit quite similar values for their recovery index, meaning that they have
similar economic structures. By contrast, Baltic countries are outliers placed at
two extreme positions (Lithuania is relatively more flexible than Estonia). The
opposite occurs for resistance: Baltic countries share a similar ranking, whereas
CEB countries exhibit large differences (Czech Republic and Hungary are less
exposed to disturbances than Slovakia and Poland).
2. The multidimensional aspect of resilience is further investigated by applying
centered PCA to our parameter estimates. Eliminating non-informative
correlations, we individuate three principal components that explain about the
77% of the estimated deep parameter variability. The first component is a rough
measure of real rigidities relative to nominal stickiness; the second component
measures the preferences for price stability relatively to the financial markets
development; the last component reveals the preference for output stabilization
relatively to consumption smoothing and other sources of output persistence.
3. Centered PCA stresses the peculiarity of Hungary, reflecting its relative price
flexibility. It then individuates two groups of countries. On the one hand, Czech
Republic, Estonia and Lithuania are characterized by a relative high preference for
price stability on output and more persistence in the domestic price dynamics. On
the other hand, Poland and the Slovak Republic reveal a relatively small number
of households who cannot access to the financial markets. Within the last group,
however, PCA individuates further differences: Slovakia (Poland) observes a
relative high (low) preference for output stabilization relatively to consumption
smoothing.
4. Investigating the impact of the financial crisis in the Baltic and Central European
countries on output, we find that a capital quality and net worth shock have a
similar impact on Czech Republic and Estonia, on the one hand, and on Hungary,
Lithuania; Poland, and Slovakia, on the other. The latter group suffers more
severe GDP contractions after financial turmoil. Countries also exhibit different
recovery capacities.
5. Our comparative exercise shows that Hungary is the most vulnerable country to
external shocks, as it has the less effective economic structure to absorb them.
However, Hungary is also the most immune country compared to the rest of the
economies considered, as it is also characterized by low disturbance frequencies.
Estonia exhibits instead the lowest vulnerability to external shocks. Given the two
polar cases described above, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia show slight
(strong) recovery capacity compared to Hungary (Estonia). Instead, ranked by
the resistance index, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia demonstrate lower
(greater) immunity than Hungary (Estonia).
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Our paper is related to research that studies the resilience of regional economies and the 
recent strand of DSGE model that introduces financial frictions into a New Keynesian 
framework. 
Concerning the first strand of literature, notwithstanding the growing interest among 
macro–economists, regional analysts, spatial economists, and economic geographers, 
the concept of resilience is associated to some ambiguities. Ambiguities are related to 
the different uses and interpretations of the term.3 However, ambiguities should not be 
the rush to dismiss the concept, they vanish once that a clear definition is assumed 
(Martin, 2012).  
A useful taxonomy of resilience is provided by Martin (2012). He summarizes resilience 
in four dimensions.  
i) Resistance as the degree of sensitivity or depth of reaction of regional economy 
to a recessionary shock.  
ii) Recovery as the speed and degree of recovery of regional economy from a 
recessionary shock. 
iii) Renewal as the extent to which regional economy renews its growth path: 
resumption of pre-recession path or hysteretic shift to new growth trend. 
iv) Re-orientation as the extent of re-orientation and adaptation of regional economy 
in response to recessionary shock. Our paper matches the first two dimensions, 
whereas it is only indirectly related to the others.  
An alternative related definition of resilient society is provided by Manca et al. (2017: 5). 
“A resilient society is able to cope with and react to shocks or persistent structural 
changes by either resisting to it (absorptive capacity) or by adopting a degree of 
flexibility and making small changes to the system (adaptive capacity). At the limit, 
when disturbances are not manageable anymore, the system needs to engineer bigger 
changes, which in extreme cases will lead to a transformation (transformative 
capacity).” We evaluate the absorptive and adaptive capacities of the CEE region and, 
somehow, its ex-post transformative capacity, i.e., the capacity of CEE economies to 
have implemented in the past crises changes that permit them to cope with the recent 
global turmoil.  
Regarding the developments of DSGE literature in the direction of financial frictions, we 
borrow the specification of the banking sector from Gertler and Karadi (2011) and 
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), explicit modeling financial intermediation. An agency 
problem introduces endogenous constraints on the leverage ratios of intermediaries. As 
a result, in the financial sector, credit flows are tied to the equity capital of 
intermediaries. A deterioration of intermediary capital raises credit costs, lowering 
lending and borrowing. Their approach to model credit frictions has become quite 
popular (e.g., Lendvai et al., 2013; Andreasen et al., 2013; Beqiraj el al., 2016; 
Rannenberg, 2016), especially to study the effectiveness of unconventional monetary 
policy in financial crisis (e.g., Dedola et al., 2013; Gertler and Karadi, 2013, 2015).4  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly illustrates the impact of 
the global financial crisis within the CEE region. Section 3 describes our theoretical 
regional model. Section 4 presents our estimation results. By using our empirical 
outcomes, Section 5 discusses the resilience of CEB economies in a comparative 
perspective. Section 6 concludes.  
                                           
3 See Christopherson et al. (2010), Hudson, (2010), Pendall et al. (2010), Martin (2012). 
4 Alternative models have been suggested, other New Keynesian extensions to financial frictions are built on the external finance 
premium introduced by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999) or collateral constraints based on Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997). Different approaches are critically surveyed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Christiano et al. (2014) and Brzoza-Brzezina et 
al. (2015). 
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2 Central Europe region and the financial crisis 
CEE economies and, among them, Central Europe and the Baltics have been severally 
affected by recent global financial turmoil. External shocks, from Lehman Brothers’ 
collapse to the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis, had devastating effects, hitting CEE 
hardest among the emerging markets regions. The weak performance of CEE region 
resulted from the combination of initial imbalances and external financial shocks. The 
imbalances that built up in the Great Moderation period left in fact the transition 
economies highly vulnerable. However, CEE countries were differently impacted by 
global financial instability according to the strength, timing and speed of the impact. For 
instance, the crisis was managed quite well by Poland and the Czech Republic, while the 
Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania experienced huge collapse in GDP. As a result, the 
debate on resilience capacity, i.e., the multidimensional attitude of economic systems to 
isolate from, absorb shocks, adapt or transform towards new sustainable development 
path, emerged with stronger emphasis in the aftermath of the crisis.  
The eruption of the global financial crisis triggered high risks of banking instability in CEE 
region. The expected unwinding of real estate booms and the potential disruptive 
adjustment of exchange rates, and macroeconomic imbalances were expected to wreak 
havoc on bank balance sheets. However, banking crises were generally avoided; 
portfolio losses in fact were gradually absorbed by considerable preexisting buffers and 
macroeconomic adjustment proceeded more smoothly than expected. 5  Notable 
exceptions were Latvia, Ukraine, and (somehow) Slovenia.6  
The global and euro zone crises hard hit the CEE region through their open economy 
channel. The crash of property prices in some countries and distressed domestic financial 
markets, where financial institutions were exposed by toxic debts, triggered a massive 
contraction of lending (global deleveraging) and reduced the willingness of financial 
markets to finance sovereign debt. The recession then reduced demand for exports in 
Western Europe, impacting on production and employment in CEE small-open 
economies7 and to a less extent to larger CEE economies, as Poland and Romania. In 
2009 all CEE countries faced massive reduction in their exports on GDP. The best 
performance was that of Romania: a reduction of 14% on previous period (in 2008 it 
was instead +14%); the worst country was instead Lithuania, where exports fall of 27% 
(in 2008 the share was 29%, but with opposite sign). 
In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’ collapse, the most evident effect of the crisis 
was a decrease in GDP growth rate followed by absolute decrease in its volume. A 
dramatic slump happened in 2009. All CEE countries experienced a fall in GDP volumes 
compared to 2008, except Poland. In Baltic Republics percentage decrease was two-
digit.  
The impact of the recessionary shock on the growth path of CEB economies is shown in 
Figure 1. This national picture observes quite disparate—in fact, strongly divergent—GDP 
growth patterns among the major countries of the region. Heterogeneous trends are the 
product of multiple underlying forces and processes. Central Europe and Baltic countries 
have differently reacted to the financial turmoil and consequent recession exhibiting 
disparities in the degree of resilience. The crisis strongly affected the Baltic countries, 
which were livelier before the Lehman Brothers’ crash. A similar pattern can be observed 
                                           
5 Several factors prevented disruptive macroeconomic adjustments; among them, lending arrangements from IMF and other EU in 
member countries; EBRD, EIB, and World Bank provided funds to the banking system. Banking systems also benefited from the 
prevalence of parent-subsidiary relationships. 
6 Latvia experienced the collapse of a large bank, Ukraine had widespread problems, and Slovenia observed relatively small and 
targeted recapitalization. 
7 It is worth noting that exports in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia and Hungary account for about 70-80% of GDP. 
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in Czech Republic and Hungary. Poland and Slovak Republic GDP were only moderately 
affected. Indeed, Poland has not experienced recession, keeping all the time positive 
rate of GDP growth. Already in 2009, Poland and Slovakia experienced a real GDP above 
their 2007 level. Other countries take much more time to recover. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Growth and recessionary shocks in selected CEB economies, GDP [1997=100] 
(Source IMF) 
 
Similar patterns can be observed in the employment dynamics. As noted by Martin 
(2012), movements in employment are more significant since it tends to take much 
longer than output to recover from recession. Moreover, regional local economies may 
resume output growth after a recession without recovering in employment (jobless 
recovery). During the recession, employment fell in all countries besides Poland, though 
less than proportionally to the decrease in GDP. However, in Estonia was two-digit, 
whereas in the others it was less than 3 per cent. In Hungary, Lithuania and Estonia 
some decrease took place already in 2008. In the first half of 2010 employment was 
declining in all CEE countries besides Slovenia. The highest decline was registered in 
Baltic Republics and Bulgaria. 
 
3 A small open–economy model with financial imperfections 
We consider a simple small-open medium–scale New Keynesian economy characterized 
by nominal price and wage rigidities, consumption habits and investment adjustment 
costs. The economy is augmented with an imperfect banking sector by assuming that 
firms borrow indirectly from households through the banking sector that operates in an 
imperfect financial market. Financial frictions are twofold: i) Only a fraction of the 
households can access the credit market by financial intermediaries (limited–asset 
99.8
100.0
100.2
100.4
100.6
100.8
101.0
1997 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Lithuania Poland Slovak Republic
 8 
 
market participation assumption, LAMP henceforth). 8  ii) An agency problem between 
banks and their depositors implies that financial intermediaries are subject to 
endogenously determined balance sheet constraints that could limit the ability of non–
financial firms to obtain investment funds (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).  
 
3.1 Production 
The supply side of the economy is characterized by a retail competitive sector that 
combines intermediate goods produced by labor and capital to obtain the final 
consumption good. The final sector operates under imperfect competition and is subject 
to price stickiness. By contrast, intermediate goods and capital producing firms operate 
in competitive markets. Intermediate firms borrow from the banks to acquire physical 
capital.  
The intermediate goods sector is composed by a continuum of competitive producers. 
The typical firm uses labor inputs and capital to produce intermediate goods 𝑌𝑡 sold to 
retail firms, according to the following Cobb–Douglas technology: 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡
𝛼(𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝐾𝑡)
1−𝛼  
where 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) is the labor share, 𝐴𝑡 represents the total factor productivity, 𝐿𝑡 denotes 
labor inputs hired, 𝐾𝑡  is the capital stock and 𝑢𝑡
𝑘  is the utilization rate of the capital. 
Capital acquisition is financed by borrowing from a financial intermediary.  
Denoting the real wage by 𝑊𝑡, the real marginal cost by 𝑀𝐶𝑡, the capital depreciation 
function by 𝛿(𝑢𝑡
𝑘), and the market value of a unit of capital by 𝑄𝑡, the firm’s first–order 
conditions are: 
 𝑊𝑡 = 𝛼𝑀𝐶𝑡
𝑌𝑡
𝐿𝑡
  
 𝑢𝑡
𝑘 = 𝑀𝐶𝑡(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑡
𝛿′(𝑢𝑡
𝑘)𝐾𝑡
  
 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅 =
𝑀𝐶𝑡+1(1 − 𝛼)𝑌𝑡+1/𝐾𝑡+1 + 𝑄𝑡+1 − 𝛿(𝑢𝑡+1
𝑘 )
𝑄𝑡
  
which implicitly define a labor and capital demand (utilization rate of the physical 
capital).  
Capital producing firms act in perfect competition. At the end of period 𝑡 , they buy 
capital from the intermediate sector repairing the depreciated capital and building new 
capital stock. Both the repaired and the new capital are then sold. A typical capital 
producing firm maximizes discounted profits, i.e., 
 max   𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝜏−𝑡Λ𝑡,𝜏 {(𝑄𝜏 − 1)𝐼𝑁𝜏 − ℱ (
𝐼𝑁𝜏 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑁𝜏−1 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠
) (𝐼𝑁𝜏 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠)}
∞
𝜏=t
  
where ℱ(1) = ℱ′(1) = 0  and ℱ′′(1) > 0 , 𝛽 ∈ (0,1)  is the discount factor, Λ𝑡,𝜏  denotes the 
stochastic discount factor between 𝑡 and 𝜏, 𝐼𝑁𝑡 ≡ 𝐼𝑡 − 𝛿(𝑢𝑡
𝑘)𝐾𝑡 is the net capital created (𝐼𝑡 
and 𝐼𝑠𝑠 are gross capital and its steady state) and 𝑄𝑡 should be interpreted as the Tobin’s 
Q. The first–order condition for investment is then  
                                           
8 See Galí et al. (2007). 
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𝑄𝑡 = 1 + ℱ (
𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝑂
𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑂
) + (
𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠
) ℱ′ (
𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠
) − 𝛽𝐸𝑡Λ𝑡,𝑡+1 (
𝐼𝑁𝑡+1 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠
)
2
ℱ′ (
𝐼𝑁𝑡+1 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠
) 
which describes the Q relation for net investments.  
The domestic retail firms operate in an imperfect competition environment. Aggregation 
is obtained as follows:  
 𝑌𝑡 = [∫ 𝑌𝑡(𝑗)
(𝜀𝑝
𝑑−1)/𝜀𝑝
𝑑
𝑑𝑗
1
0
]
𝜀𝑝
𝑑/(𝜀𝑝
𝑑−1)
  
where 𝑌𝑡(𝑗) is the domestic output by the domestic retailer 𝑗 and 𝜀𝑝
𝑑 is the elasticity of 
substitution between differentiated domestic goods.  
In this setup, prices are sticky according to a Calvo mechanism (we denote by 1 − 𝛾𝑝
𝑑 the 
probability of being able to reset prices). The corresponding optimal domestic price 
adjustment and aggregate domestic inflation are then described by the following 
expressions:9  
 𝜋𝑡
𝑑,∗ =
𝜀𝑝
𝑑
𝜀𝑝𝑑 − 1
Υ𝑡
𝑑,𝑝
𝛯𝑡
𝑑,𝑝 𝜋𝑡
𝑑  
 𝜋𝑡
𝑑 = [𝛾𝑝
𝑑(𝜋𝑡−1
𝑑 )𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑 (1−𝜀𝑝
𝑑) + (1 − 𝛾𝑝
𝑑)(𝜋𝑡
𝑑,∗)
1−𝜀𝑝
𝑑
]
1/(1−𝜀𝑝
𝑑)
  
where 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑  indicates the domestic degree of indexation to past inflation.  
The domestic auxiliary variables Υ𝑡
𝑑,𝑝
 and Ξ𝑡
𝑑,𝑝
 evolve as:  
 Υ𝑡
𝑑,𝑝 = 𝑌𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽𝛾𝑝
𝑑𝐸𝑡Λ𝑡,𝑡+1(𝜋𝑡+1
𝑑 )𝜀𝑝
𝑑
(𝜋𝑡
𝑑)−𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑 𝜀𝑝
𝑑
Υ𝑡+1
𝑑,𝑝
  
 Ξ𝑡
𝑑,𝑝 = 𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽𝛾𝑝
𝑑𝐸𝑡Λ𝑡,𝑡+1(𝜋𝑡+1)
𝜀𝑝
𝑑−1(𝜋𝑡
𝑑)𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑 (1−𝜀𝑝
𝑑)Ξ𝑡+1
𝑑,𝑝 .  
The export and import retail firms also face sticky prices (we denote by 1 − 𝛾𝑝
𝑥 and 1 − 𝛾𝑝
𝑚 
the probability of being able to reset prices of the export and import retail firms, 
respectively). Each of them faces the foreign demand for the domestic goods, 𝑋𝑡, i.e., 
𝑋𝑡(𝑗) = [
𝑃𝑡
𝑥(𝑗)
𝑃𝑡
𝑥 ]
−𝜀𝑝
𝑥
𝑋𝑡 ,  or the domestic demand for the foreign consumption, 𝐶𝑡
𝑚 , and 
investment, 𝐼𝑡
𝑚 , goods, i.e., Γ𝑡(𝑗) = [
𝑃𝑡
𝑚(𝑗)
𝑃𝑡
𝑚 ]
−𝜀𝑝
𝑚
Γ𝑡 ,    ∀Γ𝑡 = {𝐶𝑡
𝑚, 𝐼𝑡
𝑚}.  In analogy with the 
domestic retail firms, optimal price adjustments and aggregate inflation rates for the 
export, 𝑙 = 𝑥, and import, 𝑙 = 𝑚, retail firms are described by the following expressions:10  
 𝜋𝑡
𝑙,∗ =
𝜀𝑝
𝑙
𝜀𝑝𝑙 − 1
Υ𝑡
𝑙,𝑝
𝛯𝑡
𝑙,𝑝 𝜋𝑡
𝑙 ,      ∀𝑙 = {𝑥, 𝑚} 
 𝜋𝑡
𝑙 = [𝛾𝑝
𝑙(𝜋𝑡−1
𝑙 )𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑙 (1−𝜀𝑝
𝑙 ) + (1 − 𝛾𝑝
𝑙)(𝜋𝑡
𝑙,∗)
1−𝜀𝑝
𝑙
]
1
1−𝜀𝑝
𝑙
   ∀𝑙 = {𝑥, 𝑚} 
                                           
9 The price inflation is 𝜋𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑃𝑡/𝑃𝑡−1; 𝜋𝑡
𝑑,∗ is the price inflation of the domestic adjusting firm. 
10 The price inflation is 𝜋𝑡
𝑙 = 𝑃𝑡/𝑃𝑡−1; 𝜋𝑡
𝑙,∗ is the price inflation of the export/import adjusting firm. 
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where 𝜀𝑝
𝑙  is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated 𝑙 -type goods and 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑙  
indicates the 𝑙-type goods’ degree of indexation to past inflation.  
The export and import auxiliary variables Υ𝑡
𝑙,𝑝
 and Ξ𝑡
𝑙,𝑝
 evolve as:  
 Υ𝑡
𝑙,𝑝 = 𝑌𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑡
𝑙 + 𝛽𝛾𝑝
𝑙𝐸𝑡Λ𝑡,𝑡+1(𝜋𝑡+1
𝑙 )𝜀𝑝
𝑙
(𝜋𝑡
𝑙)−𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑙 𝜀𝑝
𝑙
Υ𝑡+1
𝑙,𝑝   ∀= {𝑥, 𝑚} 
 Ξ𝑡
𝑙,𝑝 = 𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽𝛾𝑝
𝑙𝐸𝑡Λ𝑡,𝑡+1(𝜋𝑡+1)
𝜀𝑝
𝑙 −1(𝜋𝑡
𝑙)𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑙 (1−𝜀𝑝
𝑙 )Ξ𝑡+1
𝑙,𝑝   ∀= {𝑥, 𝑚} 
where 𝑀𝐶𝑡
𝑥 = 𝑃𝑡
𝑑/𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑥  and 𝑀𝐶𝑡
𝑚 = 𝑃𝑡
∗𝑒𝑡/𝑃𝑡
𝑚  are the export and import marginal costs, 
respectively, with 𝑒𝑡 defining the nominal exchange rate.  
 
3.2 Financial market 
3.2.1 Limited–asset market participation 
Households can be either liquidity constrained or not. However, apart from their ability 
to access to the financial market they share the same kind of preferences. Formally, 
there is a continuum of households in the space [0,1]. The household’s period preferences 
are defined as: 
 𝒰𝑡 =
(𝐶𝑡+𝑖 − ℎ𝐶𝑡+𝑖−1)
1 − 𝜎
1−𝜎
− 𝜒
𝐿𝑡+𝑖
1+𝜑
1 + 𝜑
  
where 𝐶𝑡  is the aggregate consumption, ℎ ∈ [0,1)  denotes the habits in consumption 
parameter, 𝜒 measures the relative weight of the labor disutility, 𝜑 is the inverse Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply and 𝜎 is the relative risk–aversion coefficient.  
Non–liquidity constrained households (“dynamic optimizer households” from now on) 
solve the following intertemporal optimization problem: 
 max 𝒲𝑡
𝑂
𝐶𝑡+𝑖
𝑂 ,𝐿𝑡+𝑖,𝐵𝑡+𝑖,𝐵𝑡+𝑖
∗ =   𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑖 [
(𝐶𝑡+𝑖
𝑂 − ℎ𝐶𝑡+𝑖−1
𝑂 )
1 − 𝜎
1−𝜎
− 𝜒
𝐿𝑡+𝑖
1+𝜑
1 + 𝜑
]
∞
𝑖=0
  
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝐶𝑡
𝑂 + 𝐵𝑡+1 + 𝑒𝑡𝐵𝑡+1
∗ = 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 + Π𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡𝐵𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡Φ𝑡𝑅𝑡
∗𝐵𝑡
∗ 
where 𝐶𝑡
𝑂  is the consumption of the dynamic optimizer households, 𝑅𝑡  and 𝑅𝑡
∗  are the 
gross real domestic and foreign return of one period real domestic and foreign bonds, 
respectively, 𝐵𝑡  and 𝐵𝑡
∗ are the total quantity of short term domestic and foreign debt 
that the household acquires, respectively, Π𝑡 are the net payouts to the household from 
ownership of both non–financial and financial firms and 𝑇𝑡 is a lump sum net transfer. 
Finally, Φ𝑡 denotes the risk premium on foreign bond holdings given by  
 Φ𝑡 = exp [ (𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡
∗) − 𝜙𝑎𝐴𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡
𝜙
],  
where 𝐴𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡𝐵𝑡+1
∗  denotes the net foreign assets (NFA) position, 𝜙𝑎  denotes the risk 
premium elasticity to the NFA position and 𝑢𝑡
𝜙
 is the risk premium shock on foreign bond 
holdings, which is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive stochastic process 
𝑢𝑡
𝜙
= 𝑢
𝑢𝑖𝑝,𝑡−1
𝜌𝑢𝑖𝑝 𝑒𝜖𝑢𝑖𝑝,𝑡.  
From the non-liquidity constrained household’s optimization problem, the first–order 
conditions for consumption, 𝐶𝑡
𝑂 , domestic and foreign bond holdings, 𝐵𝑡  and 𝐵𝑡
∗ 
respectively, are:  
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 𝜚𝑡
𝑂 = (𝐶𝑡
𝑂 − ℎ𝐶𝑡−1
𝑂 )−𝜎 − 𝛽ℎ𝐸𝑡(𝐶𝑡+1
𝑂 − ℎ𝐶𝑡
𝑂)−𝜎  
 𝐸𝑡𝛽Λ𝑡,𝑡+1𝑅𝑡+1 = 1  
 𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑡𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡+1Φ𝑡+1𝑅𝑡+1
∗   
where Λ𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝜚𝑡+1
𝑂 /𝜚𝑡
𝑂 denotes the stochastic discount rate.  
Instead, LAMP households solve: 
 max 𝒲𝑡
𝐿
𝐶𝑡+𝑖
𝐿 ,𝐿𝑡+𝑖
=   𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑖 [
(𝐶𝑡+𝑖
𝐿 − ℎ𝐶𝑡+𝑖−1
𝐿 )
1 − 𝜎
1−𝜎
− 𝜒
𝐿𝑡+𝑖
1+𝜑
1 + 𝜑
]
∞
𝑖=0
  
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝐶𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 . 
According to the budget constraint, their optimal consumption is equal to 
 𝐶𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡  
and their marginal utility of consumption is 
 𝜚𝑡
𝐿 = (𝐶𝑡
𝐿 − ℎ𝐶𝑡−1
𝐿 )−𝜎 − 𝛽ℎ𝐸𝑡(𝐶𝑡+1
𝐿 − ℎ𝐶𝑡
𝐿)−𝜎 .  
The aggregate demand for consumption goods is obtained using a CES aggregator of 
domestically produced and imported consumption, 𝐶𝑡, and investment, 𝐼𝑡, i.e., 
 𝐶𝑡 = [(1 − 𝜈)
1
𝜂(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
𝜂−1
𝜂 + 𝜈
1
𝜂(𝐶𝑡
𝑚)
𝜂−1
𝜂 ]
𝜂
𝜂−1
,  
 𝐼𝑡 = [(1 − 𝜈)
1
𝜂(𝐼𝑡
𝑑)
𝜂−1
𝜂 + 𝜈
1
𝜂(𝐼𝑡
𝑚)
𝜂−1
𝜂 ]
𝜂
𝜂−1
,  
where, from households’ cost minimization problem, the demand for domestic and 
foreign produced consumption and investment goods are given by 𝐶𝑡
𝑑 = (1 − 𝜈)[𝑃𝑡
𝑑/𝑃𝑡]
−𝜂𝐶𝑡, 
𝐼𝑡
𝑑 = (1 − 𝜈)[𝑃𝑡
𝑑/𝑃𝑡]
−𝜂𝐼𝑡 , 𝐶𝑡
𝑚 = 𝜈[𝑃𝑡
𝑚/𝑃𝑡]
−𝜂𝐶𝑡  and 𝐼𝑡
𝑚 = 𝜈[𝑃𝑡
𝑚/𝑃𝑡]
−𝜂𝐼𝑡  respectively, where 𝜈 
denotes the home bias parameter and 𝜂  is the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and imported goods. 𝑃𝑡
𝑑  and 𝑃𝑡
𝑚  denote the price indexes of domestic and 
imported goods, respectively, such that: 
 𝑃𝑡 = [(1 − 𝜈)(𝑃𝑡
𝑑)1−𝜂 + 𝜈(𝑃𝑡
𝑚)1−𝜂]
1
1−𝜂.  
 
3.2.2 The banks’ balance sheet constraints 
Each dynamic optimizer household is composed by workers and bankers. The workers 
supply labor and redistribute their labor income within their household. Each banker 
manages a financial intermediary and returns its earnings back to its family. Banks are 
owned by the fraction of households that are dynamic optimizers as well. Each period a 
fraction 𝜃 of bankers survives while a fraction 1 − 𝜃 exits and is replaced.  
Each banker can divert a fraction 𝜁  of funds to its family. Diverting assets can be 
profitable for a banker who can then default on his debt and shut down, and 
correspondingly represent a loss for creditors who could reclaim the fraction 1 − 𝜁  of 
assets, at most.  
 12 
 
Financial intermediaries obtain 𝐵𝑗𝑡+1  funds from the dynamic optimizer households 
(short–term liabilities) and lend them to non–financial firms (holding long–term assets). 
Each bank faces a quantity of financial claims 𝑆𝑗𝑡 by the non–financial firms and owns an 
amount of net worth denoted by 𝑁𝑗𝑡. Thus, the balance sheet of an intermediary is: 
 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 = 𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝐵𝑗𝑡+1  
where 𝑄𝑡 is the relative price of a financial claim.  
The bank pays back a real gross return 𝑅𝑡+1 on the funds obtained from the household 
and earns the stochastic return 𝑅𝑘𝑡+1  on the loans to non–financial firms. 𝑁𝑗𝑡  can be 
thought as the intermediaries’ equity capital and it is obtained as the difference between 
the earnings on assets (𝑅𝑘𝑡+1𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡) and interest payments on liabilities (𝑅𝑡+1𝐵𝑗𝑡+1). Hence: 
 𝑁𝑗𝑡+1 = (𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1)𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡+1𝑁𝑗𝑡  
The term (𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) represents the premium that the banker earns on his assets.  
Each banker’s objective is to maximize the expected discounted present value of its 
future flows of net worth 𝑁𝑡, that is: 
 𝑉𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 ∑(
∞
𝑖=0
1 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑖𝛽𝑖+1Λ𝑡,𝑡+1+𝑖𝑁𝑗𝑡+𝑖  
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), a moral hazard problem is assumed to avoid that in 
presence of positive premium the bankers will expand their loans indefinitely.  
Therefore, depositors would restrict their credit to banks as they realize that the 
following incentive constraint must hold for the banks to prevent them from diverting 
funds:  
 𝑉𝑗𝑡 ≥ 𝜁𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡  
i.e., the potential loss of diverting assets (l.h.s. of the above equation) should be greater 
than the gain from doing so (r.h.s. of the above expression). Moreover, 𝑉𝑗𝑡  can be 
expressed as 
 𝑉𝑗𝑡 = 𝜐𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡  
where 𝜂𝑡 represents the expected discounted value of having an additional unit of net 
worth and 𝜐𝑡  must be interpreted as the expected discounted marginal gain to the 
banker of expanding assets 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 by a unit.  
In this framework, the financial intermediary can acquire assets accordingly to his equity 
capital: 
 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 =
𝜂𝑡
𝜁 − 𝜐𝑡
𝑁𝑗𝑡 = 𝜙𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡  
where 𝜙𝑡 is the private leverage ratio, i.e., the ratio of privately intermediated assets to 
equity. 
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), 11 the expected discounted marginal gain to the banker 
of expanding assets, QtSt, by a unit is given by 
                                           
11 See Gertler and Karadi (2011) for the evolution of 𝜐𝑡  and 𝜂𝑡 and a wider discussion about the agency problem. 
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𝜐𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{(1 − 𝜃)𝛽Λ𝑡,𝑡+1(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝛽Λ𝑡,𝑡+1𝜃𝑥𝑡,𝑡+1𝜐𝑡+1} 
and the expected discounted value of having another unit of 𝑁𝑡 keeping fixed 𝑆𝑡 
𝜂𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{(1 − 𝜃) + 𝛽Λ𝑡,𝑡+1𝜃𝑧𝑡,𝑡+1𝜂𝑡+1} 
where 𝑥𝑡,𝑡+1 =
𝜙𝑡+1
𝜙𝑡+1
𝑧𝑡,𝑡+1 and 𝑥𝑡,𝑡+1 =
(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1−𝑅𝑡+1)𝜙𝑡
𝑅𝑡+1
. 
 
3.3 Labor market 
Labor markets are imperfect: sticky wages are set by monopolistic unions, who 
represent differentiated labor inputs provided by both dynamic optimizers and LAMP 
agents. Labor unions set the nominal wages facing nominal rigidities à la Calvo. Labor is 
aggregated according to a Dixit–Stiglitz function, where we indicate the elasticity of 
substitution between labor inputs by 𝜀𝑤.  
Formally, a typical union chooses the optimal nominal wage 𝑊𝑡
∗ to maximize a weighted 
utility function: 
max𝑊𝑡∗ ∑(𝛾𝑤𝛽)
𝑗
{𝑊𝑡
∗ (
𝑊𝑡
∗
𝑊𝑡+𝑗
)
−𝜀𝑤
𝐿𝑡+𝑗 [𝜆𝜚𝑡+𝑗
𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆)𝜚
𝑡+𝑗
𝑂 ]
∞
𝑗=0
−
𝜒
1 + 𝜑
[(
𝑊𝑡
∗
𝑊𝑡+𝑗
)
−𝜀𝑤
𝐿𝑡+𝑗]
1+𝜑
} 
where 𝛾𝑤 is the probability to keep the wage unchanged in the future.  
Solving the above problem we obtain the adjustment dynamics for wage inflation12  
 𝜋𝑡
𝑤∗ =
𝜀𝑤
𝜀𝑤 − 1
Υ𝑡
𝑤
𝛯𝑡
𝑤 𝜋𝑡
𝑤  
 𝜋𝑡
𝑤 = [𝛾𝑤(𝜋𝑡−1
𝑤 )1−𝜀𝑤 + (1 − 𝛾𝑤)(𝜋𝑡
𝑤∗)
1−𝜀𝑤
]
1
1−𝜀𝑤 .  
Auxiliary variables Υ𝑡
𝑤 and Ξ𝑡
𝑤 evolve according to: 
 Υ𝑡
𝑤 = 𝑈𝐿,𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑤𝛽𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+1
𝑤 )𝜀𝑤Υ𝑡+1
𝑤   
 Ξ𝑡
𝑤 = 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡[𝜆𝜚𝑡
𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆)𝜚𝑡
𝑂] + 𝛾𝑤𝛽𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+1
𝑤 )𝜀𝑤−1Ξ𝑡+1
𝑤 .  
 
3.4 Aggregation, resource constraint, and government policies 
The economy–wide resource constraint is given by 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑡
𝑥 + 𝐼𝑡
𝑑 + 𝐼𝑡
𝑥 + 𝐺𝑡 +
𝜓
2
(
𝐼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝐼𝑆𝑆
𝐼𝑡−1
𝑁 + 𝐼𝑆𝑆
− 1)
2
(𝐼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝐼𝑆𝑆)  
where 𝜓 indicates the elasticity of investment adjustment cost.  
The market clearing condition in the foreign bond market requires that, at the 
equilibrium, the equation for NFA evolution is satisfied: 
 𝑒𝑡𝐵𝑡+1
∗ = 𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑥(𝐶𝑡
𝑥 + 𝐼𝑡
𝑥) − 𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑡
∗(𝐶𝑡
𝑚 + 𝐼𝑡
𝑚) + 𝑒𝑡Φ𝑡𝑅𝑡
∗𝐵𝑡
∗  
                                           
12 The wage inflation is 𝜋𝑡
𝑤 = 𝑊𝑡/𝑊𝑡−1; 𝜋𝑡
𝑤∗ = 𝑊𝑡
∗/𝑊𝑡−1 is the wage inflation of the adjusting union. 
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where 
 
 
 
1 + 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
. 
 
As in Galì et al. (2007), the aggregate consumption is 
 𝐶𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝐶𝑡
𝑂 + 𝜆𝐶𝑡
𝐿 .  
The total value of intermediated assets is: 
 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡 = 𝜙𝑡𝑁𝑡 .  
The law of motion of capital is 
 𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝑡 .  
Government expenditures 𝐺𝑡 are financed by lump sum taxes  
 𝐺𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡 .  
Finally, the nominal interest rate 𝑖𝑡 follows a simple Taylor rule 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌)(𝜅𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜅𝑦𝑦𝑡) + 𝜅𝛥𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜅𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑡  
where 𝜌 denotes the degree of interest rate smoothing, 𝜅𝜋 measures the response of the 
monetary authority to inflation and 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡/𝑃𝑡−1 denotes the CPI inflation gross rate.  
 
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Data and methodology 
We estimate our model, using Bayesian techniques, for a group of six countries, namely: 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. Our choice is 
motivated by the fact that Bayesian methods outperform GMM and maximum likelihood 
in small samples.13 The sample we consider spans from 2002:Q1 to 2016:Q3 for all the 
countries. 
After writing the model in state-space form, the likelihood function is evaluated using the 
Kalman filter, whereas prior distributions are used to introduce additional non-sample 
information into the parameters estimation. Once a prior distribution is elicited, the 
posterior density for the structural parameters can be obtained by reweighting the 
likelihood by a prior. The posterior is computed using numerical integration by employing 
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm for Monte Carlo integration; for the sake of simplicity, 
all structural parameters are supposed to be independent of one another. 
For each country we perform the estimation by using eleven observable macroeconomic 
variables: real GDP, real consumption, real investment, export, import, real wage, price 
inflation, CPI inflation, import inflation, export inflation, and nominal interest rate. All the 
data are drawn from the OECD database. The dynamics are driven by eleven orthogonal 
shocks, including monetary policy, productivity, public spending, domestic price mark-
up, import price mark-up, export price mark-up, wage mark-up, capital quality, foreign 
                                           
13 For an exhaustive analysis of Bayesian estimation methods, see Geweke (1999), An and Schorfheide (2007) and Fernández-
Villaverde (2010). 
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GDP, risk premium, CPI inflation. As the number of observable variables equals the 
number of exogenous shocks, the estimation does not present problems deriving from 
stochastic singularity.14 
Real variables are obtained using the CPI deflator. Inflation measures are obtained as 
the log-difference of the correspondent deflators, whereas we use the compensation rate 
as a measure for the wage. Short-term rates are used as a proxy for the nominal 
interest rate.  
Data exhibiting a trend have been filtered using a linear trend as in Smets and Wouters 
(2007). Data exhibiting a non-zero mean like inflation and nominal interest rate have 
been demeaned. 
As common practice in Bayesian estimation, several parameters are calibrated and ruled 
out from the estimation. The discount factor β is set to 0.99; the capital share α is 0.33, 
δ is calibrated to 0.025, implying an annual capital depreciation of 10%; the ratio of 
public spending over output is 20%. 
Prior distributions are elicited according to the following rules: standard errors of the 
shocks follow an Inverse Gamma distribution with mean 0.1 and 2 degrees of freedom; 
the autoregressive coefficients of the shocks follow a Beta distribution centered on 0.5 
and with standard deviation equal to 2. For the parameters with support on the interval 
[0,1], like, e.g., the smoothing parameter of the Taylor rule, the fraction of LAMP 
households, and the Calvo prices a Beta distribution have been assigned; feedback 
parameters of the Taylor rule and investment adjustment cost follow a Normal 
distribution. 
 
4.2 Estimation results 
Estimations of the structural parameters of our CEB economies are reported in Table 1 
and 2. Tables only report posteriors.15 The posterior distributions are obtained using the 
MH algorithm. The mean and posterior percentiles come from two chains of 200,000 
draws each from the MH algorithm, for which we discarded the initial 30% of draws. The 
scale for the jumping distribution in MH algorithm has been calibrated in order to achieve 
an acceptance rate around 25%. Table 1 reports the estimation of structural parameters, 
whereas Table 2 reports the stochastic structure (variability and persistence of shocks). 
Both tables report posteriors for each country and the area average and standard 
deviations since we are interested in the relative performance of the area countries. We 
stress in bold country values above the area average.16 
 
 
Table 1 – Posterior estimates (structural parameters)  
 
Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Lithuania Slovakia Poland mean s.d. 
Deep parameters 
σ 1.92 1.93 1.97 1.69 1.46 2.22 1.86 0.26 
𝜑 2.07 1.96 3.29 2.49 0.25 0.25 1.72 1.23 
ℎ 0.80 0.89 0.87 0.80 0.79 0.87 0.83 0.04 
                                           
14 The problems deriving from misspecification are widely discussed in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) and Fernández-Villaverde 
(2010). 
15 For each country, we report priors (mean and density) and posteriors (with their [5th, 95th] probability intervals), and the log–
marginal likelihood for each country. 
16 Full details on country estimations are reported in Appendix A (see tables A1-A6). 
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Nominal frictions and indexation 
𝛾𝑝
𝑑 0.86 0.84 0.44 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.81 0.19 
𝛾𝑝
𝑚 0.44 0.45 0.79 0.31 0.66 0.41 0.51 0.18 
𝛾𝑝
𝑥 0.79 0.65 0.73 0.45 0.82 0.90 0.72 0.16 
𝛾𝑤 0.90 0.89 0.58 0.84 0.94 0.70 0.81 0.14 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑  0.26 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.04 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚  0.28 0.29 0.68 0.26 0.31 0.23 0.34 0.17 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑥  0.22 0.27 0.18 0.26 0.24 0.16 0.22 0.04 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑤  0.35 0.29 0.59 0.61 0.36 0.51 0.45 0.14 
Real frictions 
𝜆 0.17 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.14 0.05 0.19 0.09 
𝜓 5.91 5.78 6.26 5.58 5.78 5.47 5.80 0.28 
𝜂 1.38 1.90 1.91 1.00 2.15 2.78 1.85 0.62 
𝜂* 1.17 1.26 0.61 1.22 1.23 1.46 1.16 0.29 
𝜙𝑎 (x10) 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.03 
z 7.44 8.37 6.40 7.13 8.03 10.00 7.90 1.24 
Monetary policy parameters 
𝜅𝜋 2.50 2.36 1.91 2.46 1.54 2.41 2.20 0.39 
𝜅𝑦 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.06 
𝜅𝛥𝑦 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.03 
𝜅𝛥𝛱 0.33 0.29 0.09 0.22 0.08 0.16 0.20 0.10 
𝜌 0.43 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.11 
 
The estimated habit parameter and the coefficient of relative risk aversion are similar 
among countries and in line with other papers (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003 and 
2007). Some differences arise for the inverse of the labor supply elasticity: in particular, 
in Hungary and Lithuania the estimated value is strongly above the average while in 
Slovakia and Poland is strongly below the average. 
Apart from Hungary, in all the other countries prices and wages seem to be very sticky 
as they adjust, on average, every 5-10 quarters. Our estimation suggests that prices 
and wages are partially indexed to lagged inflation, involving that when perturbed by a 
shock; these variables slowly revert to the steady state. The limited asset market 
participation is estimated around 20% (except for Poland where it is close to zero). 
Having a fraction of LAMP households of this dimension, entails that positive public 
spending shock can positively affect public consumption, i.e., no crowding out effects. 
The central bank has been aggressive to contrast inflation in all countries, while the 
response to the output gap, apart in Slovakia, is negligible. The degree of interest rate 
smoothing is large and in line with the DSGE literature (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters, 
2003 and 2007) where it is usually estimated to values greater than 0.7. 
Table 2 reports the posterior estimations of the stochastic structure. As expected, we 
observe a high degree of autocorrelation for the technology shock. Capital quality shocks 
are important for mimicking the effects of a financial crisis. As we can see from the 
table, there is heterogeneity in their estimates. Concentrating on the volatility, 
expressed by the standard deviation, capital quality shocks have exhibited small 
variance in Hungary and Poland, compared with the sample mean. On the other hand, in 
Slovakia the standard deviation of the capital quality shock has been around double than 
the sample mean. Difference among countries are associated also with the AR(1) 
coefficient of the capital quality shock. A high persistence is estimated for Hungary, 
Lithuania and Poland, whereas in the remaining countries the degree of inertia is small. 
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Table 2 – Posterior estimations (stochastic structure)  
 
Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Lithuania Slovakia Poland mean s.d. 
𝑒𝑎 1.85 3.68 0.61 4.73 5.85 7.80 4.09 2.63 
𝑒𝑔 19.90 38.28 16.70 23.18 19.29 21.26 23.10 7.74 
𝑒 0.30 0.42 0.25 0.56 0.32 0.16 0.33 0.14 
𝑒𝛹 2.95 4.45 0.63 4.41 7.83 0.84 3.52 2.69 
𝑒µ𝑝𝑑 8.30 8.28 3.55 13.65 17.21 7.94 9.82 4.84 
𝑒µ𝑝𝑚 2.88 3.67 19.85 9.02 7.66 5.80 8.15 6.19 
𝑒µ𝑝𝑥 11.32 6.89 4.69 8.41 12.85 14.84 9.83 3.83 
𝑒µ𝑤 14.69 18.82 10.25 16.77 33.58 24.59 19.78 8.25 
𝑒𝛱 1.15 1.21 1.92 2.67 1.39 0.99 1.55 0.63 
𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑝 3.32 5.76 3.46 4.19 4.46 5.64 4.47 1.05 
𝑒𝑦∗ 4.42 5.85 3.85 7.38 5.19 6.21 5.48 1.28 
𝜌𝑎 0.97 0.58 1.00 0.89 0.76 0.73 0.82 0.16 
𝜌𝑔 0.79 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.87 0.95 0.84 0.06 
𝜌 0.80 0.82 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.85 0.04 
𝜌𝛹 0.38 0.12 0.90 0.67 0.32 0.84 0.54 0.31 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑑 0.10 0.13 0.89 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.31 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑚 0.73 0.59 0.47 0.83 0.23 0.85 0.62 0.24 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑥 0.14 0.17 0.83 0.86 0.23 0.13 0.40 0.35 
𝜌µ𝑤 0.38 0.37 0.95 0.42 0.31 0.51 0.49 0.24 
𝜌𝑢𝑖 0.07 0.14 0.24 0.09 0.34 0.35 0.20 0.12 
𝜌𝑢𝑖𝑝 0.81 0.75 0.88 0.73 0.88 0.92 0.83 0.08 
𝜌𝑦∗ 0.80 0.90 0.91 0.84 0.90 0.93 0.88 0.05 
 
5 Resilience in Central Europe: Indexes and comparisons 
This section constructs some measures of resilience across countries populating the CEB 
area and investigates the relative performances of these countries. We focus on two 
dimensions of resilience: resistance and recovery. Specifically, we use our estimation to 
quantify the relative vulnerability or sensitivity of economies within CEB region to 
disturbances and disruptions (resistance) and the speed and extent of recovery from 
such a disruption or recession (recovery). First, we built two different kinds of measures 
of resilience by aggregating the estimated parameters through non-centered and 
centered principal component analysis (Section 5.1). Then, we use our model to 
investigate the relation between financial shock and CEB resilience (Section 5.2) and, 
more in general, between the countries’ resistance and recovery capabilities and output 
variabilities (Section 5.3). 
5.1 Central Europe regional differences 
We begin by investigating the differences of estimated parameters (Table 1 and 2) 
across countries in the CEB region by using PCA. The main idea of PCA is to reduce the 
dimensionality of data that may contain correlated variables, while retaining as much as 
possible of its variability. We adopt two kinds of PCAs in our analysis: non-centered and 
centered PCA. The difference between the two is in the reference used to compute the 
data variability. The former implies an all-zero point (vector) of reference: A country 
without distortion (if the selected parameters measure distortions, cf. Table 1)17 and/or a 
                                           
17 Note that not all estimated parameters of Table 1 measure distortions. 
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country unaffected by shocks (if the selected parameters measure shock persistence and 
variability, cf. Table 2).  By contrast, centering, or normalizing, by variables shifts the 
reference point (origin) to a hypothetical average stand.  
Summarizing, when centering is adopted, the analysis focuses on the eventual deviation 
from an “average” kind of CE country. 
1. Non-centered PCA elaborates Table 1 and 2 by investigating more deeply the 
multidimensional aspect of resilience. By applying non-centered PCA, we 
eliminate some non-informative correlation between countries’ parameters. Such 
a cleaning procedure generates a neater index for resilience in terms of recovery 
and resistance. The index of recovery is obtained applying PCA to a subset of 
estimated parameters from Table 1, precisely those that measure real or nominal 
adjustment costs. Hence, the reference of PCA in such a case is a near flexible 
economy. The index of resistance is obtained by applying non-centered PCA to 
the parameters estimate in Table 2. Thus, here the reference is a near steady 
state economy as there are no shocks and no persistence of them. 
2. Centered PCA instead focuses on all the structural parameters reported in Table 
1. As said, it aims to explain the variability of CEB countries’ parameters with 
respect to the case of an “average” kind of CEB country. 18 Here, the variability 
across the 22 parameters for each country is reduced to few uncorrelated indexes 
(three), which however retain a large part of their variability. Differently, from 
the case of the non-centered PCA, the principal components need to be 
interpreted in their economic meaning which is not trivial. 
Our results are described in Table 3 and Figure 2 and 3 (which report the outcomes of 
non-centered and centered PCA). In the main text we focus on the economic 
interpretation of PCA, details are reported in Appendix C. 
We begin with the non-centered PCA analysis. The first two main components obtained 
from two PCAs are the recovery and the resistance index of resilience. The former is 
obtained from Table 1, considering subset of parameters which can be associated to 
nominal and real rigidities according to which the economic structure diverges from the 
efficient competitive equilibrium with flexible prices and wages (the subset is listed in 
Table 3). The latter uses all the estimated parameters from Table 2 (shock persistence 
and variances).  As usual in non-centered analysis, the first components explain a large 
part of the variability (99.1% and 99.2%, respectively). The country differences are 
instead illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
18 Information regarding the absolute values is not lost, but it is synthesized in the means that in such a case have to be taken into 
account in the data analysis (see Noy-Meir 1973). 
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Figure 2 – Recovery and resistance indexes 
 
The recovery index and the resistance index are depicted in Figure 2. Low values 
correspond to high resilience. CE indicates the position of the average country. 
Comparing the countries’ resistance and recovery indexes to the benchmark (CE), Figure 
2 shows that CEB countries exhibit quite similar values for their recovery index, meaning 
that they have similar economic structures. By contrast, Baltic countries are outliers 
placed at two extreme positions (Lithuania is relatively more flexible than Estonia). By 
contrast, the opposite occurs for the resistance index. Baltic countries have a similar 
ranking, whereas Central European countries exhibit large differences. Czech Republic 
and Hungary are less exposed to disturbances than Slovakia and Poland.  
Now we look at the structural differences entailed in Table 1. The centered PCA 
individuates three principal components that explain about the 77% of the estimated 
deep parameter variability. Specifically, the first component explains the 31%; the 
second component explains about the 26% of data variability; the third component 
explains the 19% of data variability. The components are explained below, and the exact 
weights (or loadings) associated with them are reported in Appendix C. 
The first component can be roughly interpreted as a relative measure of real vs. the 
nominal rigidities affecting the economy adjustment after stochastic disturbances. It is 
higher when hours have low responses to changes in the real wages (inverse Frisch 
elasticity) and the costs of investment adjustment (relative to those stemming from 
capital utilization) are high; by contrast it falls in the degree of stickiness of wage 
domestic prices (relative to import prices). The second component measures the relative 
stance for price stability. Specifically, it compares the preferences for price stability 
(relative to output) to a measure of competitiveness (import vs. domestic ones) and the 
development of financial markets (the complement of the limited asset market 
participation). It is also negatively affected by the inverse Frisch elasticity as long as 
consumption variability of households who cannot access to credit is only determined by 
changes in labor supply. Finally, the third component roughly compares relative 
preferences for output stabilization to preferences for consumption smoothing (affected 
by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the habit parameter).  Summarizing, 
the first component is a rough measure of real rigidities relative to nominal stickiness; 
the second component measures the preferences for price stability relatively to the 
financial markets development; the last component monitors the preference for output 
stabilization relatively to consumption smoothing, 
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The country outcomes from the centered PCA are illustrated in Figure 3, where the three 
main components are plotted. The first and second are on the axes and the third one is 
measured by the area of the bubble indicating the country. The first two components 
clearly show the peculiarity of Hungary, reflecting its relative price flexibility. In all the 
other countries prices and wages are quite sticky as they adjust, on average, every 5-10 
quarters. However, the different degree of LAMP groups the remaining countries in a 
different way. On the one hand, Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania are characterized 
by a relative high preference for price stability on output and more persistence in the 
domestic price dynamics, whereas Poland and Slovak Republic for a relatively small 
number of households who cannot enter the financial markets and their inverse of the 
labor supply elasticity strongly below the average. High values of this component entail a 
preference for price stability on output, relatively more persistence in the domestic price 
dynamics and a small number of households who cannot enter the financial markets. The 
last component individuates further differences in the last group. Poland and Slovakia 
are very different from the other countries and each other’s.  The latter (former) 
observes a relative high (low) preference for output stabilization relatively to 
consumption smoothing, 
Overall, Figure 3 identifies a homogenous group of countries (Baltics and Czech 
Republic). Remaining countries are quite different. They diverge in the third component, 
but the second one groups Poland and Slovakia. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Centered PCA 
 
 
 
5.2 The impact of the financial crisis 
The effects of the financial crisis in the six estimated countries, in blue solid line, 
compared to the CEB benchmark, in red dashed line are depicted in the following Figure 
4 and 5 where a different interpretation in terms of source of the crisis is considered.  
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In Figure 4, we plot the impact of a capital quality shock on the path of output. As it can 
be easily noted, Czech Republic and Estonia share similar output dynamics and mimic 
the output path of the benchmark economy but they both observe a less pronounced fall 
after the shock than Poland where a more pronounced fall occurred. Instead, Hungary, 
Lithuania and Slovakia output path behave quite similarly in response to a capital quality 
shock. In fact, output in these countries experiences a contraction in GDP. Moreover, the 
fall in GDP is in the very short run more pronounced than the CEB average country and 
in the early medium run the considered countries recover faster to pre-shock output 
level compared to the benchmark economy. 
Figure 5 depicts the impact of a net worth shock on output for each of the CEB country. 
Czech Republic and Estonia share similar output dynamics and mimic the output path of 
the benchmark but they both observe a more pronounced fall after the shock occurred. 
They also recover to steady state values with some period lags compared to the 
benchmark country. Instead, Hungary and Slovakia output path behave similarly in 
response to a net worth shock. Output in these countries experiences a negative double-
peak with the second peak being more marked in amplitude and smoothed than the first 
collapse. Moreover, the fall in GDP is less strong than the CEB average country and both 
countries recover faster to pre-shock output level. GDP decline in Poland, as a 
consequence of a net worth shock, is the most evident compared to the other countries 
within the region. Poland takes also much more time to recover compared to the 
benchmark and the other observed countries. Finally, Lithuania, after the initial GDP fall, 
demonstrates a relatively quick recover ability overcoming the path of the CEB average 
country which is initially less negatively affected by a net worth shock. 
 
Figure 4 – Output IRF to a capital quality shock 
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Figure 5 – Output IRF to a net wealth shock 
 
5.3 Resistance and recovery 
Finally, we closely study resilience as an ability to absorb external (recovery) shocks and 
remain immune to them (resistance). The first phenomenon is analyzed using a method 
based on simulations and related empirical moments. Regarding the recovery capacity, 
after computing output variance for each country in the sample, we calculate the 
empirical moments assuming that the stochastic structure is that of the country, while 
the structure of the deep parameters refers to the CEB region average (see Table 1). 
Then we calculate the percentage difference between these two measures. The 
difference, if positive (negative), measures the stronger (weaker) recovery capacity of 
the country's economic structure for the same stochastic structure than an average 
hypothetical region. Similarly, we calculate resilience as an ability to immunize from 
shocks. For each country we calculate the empirical moments assuming that the 
stochastic structure is the average of the Central Baltic Europe area (Table 2), while the 
structure of the parameters is country specific (see Table 1). Also in this case, a positive 
(negative) difference measures a greater (lower) ability to immunize from shocks than 
an average hypothetical region.  
Our results are described in Table 3. As it can be easily noted, Hungary is the most 
vulnerable country to external shocks, as it has the less effective economic structure to 
absorb them. However, Hungary is also the most immune country compared to the rest 
of the economies considered in this analysis. Estonia, instead, is the less vulnerable 
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country to external shocks compared with the remaining economies. In case resistance 
is considered, Hungary is positioned next to Poland in the race for the less immune 
country. Given the two polar cases described above, Czech Republic, Lithuania and 
Slovakia, show slight (strong) recovery capacity compared to Hungary (Estonia). 
Instead, when ranked by the resistance index, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia 
demonstrate lower (greater) immunity than Hungary (Estonia). 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Output variability: Recovery and resistance 
 
Recovery Resistance 
Czech Republic -0.079 -0.004 
Estonia 0.954 -0.386 
Hungary -0.907 0.876 
Lithuania -0.449 0.062 
Poland -0.291 -0.450 
Slovakia -0.239 0.688 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
The recent financial crisis had severe but heterogeneous worldwide impacts. Strong 
cross-country disparities in the resistance and recovery capacities have been observed. 
Focusing on a CEE sub-region (Central Europe and the Baltics, CEB), we analyze the 
resilience performance to the 2008 financial crisis within countries of this region 
according to their shock isolation and absorptive capacities.  
We developed and estimated by Bayesian techniques a small-open economy DSGE 
model, which features nominal wage and price rigidities, as well as financial frictions in 
the form of liquidity-constrained households and limited access to deposits for the bank 
system. We focus on two dimensions of the resilience: resistance and recovery. 
Specifically, we aim to quantify the relative vulnerability or sensitivity of economies 
within CEB region to disturbances and disruptions (resistance) and the speed and extent 
of recovery from such a disruption or recession (recovery).  
Accordingly, we study the relative differences across CEB economies using PCA obtaining 
synthetic orthogonal indexes of these differences in a parsimonious way. Our parameter 
estimates have been grouped into structural parameters and stochastic structure. The 
former individuates the deep parameters affecting the economic recovery capacities 
after stochastic disturbances (innovations) occur; the latter governs the innovation 
distributions and their intrinsic persistence. Finally, we use both to compare the relative 
recovery (resistance) country performances of a single country to those of a hypothetical 
economy characterized by a CEB average structural (stochastic) set of estimated 
parameters. Precisely, considering estimated parameters as variables of a cross-
sectional dataset organized by country, we first look at national differences considering 
as reference a hypothetical country, where there are no distortions and/or unaffected by 
disturbances; second we use, as reference, a hypothetical average country, built on the 
estimated parameter means. 
By using our Bayesian estimations and non-centered PCA analysis, resistance and 
recovery have been investigated.  CEB countries share similar values for their recovery 
index, meaning that they have similar economic structures. By contrast, Baltic countries 
placed at two extreme positions (Lithuania is relatively more flexible than Estonia). The 
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opposite verifies for resistance: Baltic countries share a similar ranking, whereas CEB 
countries exhibit strong differences (Czech Republic and Hungary are less exposed to 
disturbances than Slovakia and Poland). 
Centered PCA is also performed and three principal components explaining about the 
77% of the estimated deep parameter variability have been individuated. The first 
component measures real vs. nominal stickiness; the second component identifies the 
preferences for price stability relatively to the financial markets development; the third 
and last component reveals the preference for output stabilization relatively to 
consumption smoothing and other sources of output persistence. Hungary positions for 
its relative price flexibility. It then individuates two groups of countries. On the one 
hand, Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania are characterized by a relative high 
preference for price stability on output and more persistence in the domestic price 
dynamics. Poland and the Slovak Republic reveal a relatively small number of 
households who cannot access to the financial markets. Within the last group, however, 
PCA individuates further disparities: Slovakia (Poland) observes a relative high (low) 
preference for output stabilization relatively to consumption smoothing. 
Investigating the impact on output of the financial crisis in the Baltics and Central 
European countries, we find that capital quality and net worth shocks share similar 
impact on Czech Republic and Estonia, on the one hand, and on Hungary, Lithuania; 
Poland, and Slovakia, on the other.  
Our comparative exercise shows that Hungary is the most vulnerable country to external 
shocks, as it has the less effective economic structure to absorb them. However, 
Hungary is also the most immune country compared to the rest of the economies 
considered, as it is also characterized by low disturbance frequencies. Estonia exhibits 
instead the lowest vulnerability to external shocks. Given the two polar cases described 
above, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia show slight (strong) recovery capacity 
compared to Hungary (Estonia). Instead, ranked by the resistance index, Czech 
Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia demonstrate lower (greater) immunity than Hungary 
(Estonia). 
Despite cross-country differences with respect to pre-crisis vulnerability and resilience 
capacity and post-crisis policy responses, several common factors prevented disruptive 
macroeconomic adjustments in the region.  Among others, lending arrangements from 
IMF and other EU financial support programs were targeted to mitigate the detrimental 
effects on the crisis on the economic activity.    
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1 – Czech Republic prior and posterior estimates  
Parameter Prior (mean, s.d.) Posterior Mean 90% HPD interval 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑑 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.102 [0.016, 0.182] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑚 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.732 [0.590, 0.876] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑥 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.144 [0.028, 0.258] 
𝜌µ𝑤 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.377 [0.200, 0.551] 
𝜌𝛹 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.379 [0.083, 0.730] 
𝜌𝑎 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.971 [0.954, 0.987] 
𝜌𝑔 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.787 [0.717, 0.859] 
𝜌𝑦∗ beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.802 [0.757, 0.848] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.065 [0.011, 0.118] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖𝑝 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.814 [0.769, 0.858] 
𝜌𝛱 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.434 [0.295, 0.566] 
σ norm (1.5, 0.375) 1.916 [1.379, 2.463] 
𝜑 norm (2, 0.75) 2.065 [1.065, 3.055] 
ℎ beta (0.7, 0.1) 0.796 [0.719, 0.878] 
𝜓 norm (5.5, 0.5) 5.909 [5.125, 6.657] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑑 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.861 [0.819, 0.897] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑚 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.435 [0.329, 0.536] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑥 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.788 [0.724, 0.849] 
𝛾𝑤 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.899 [0.850, 0.950] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.258 [0.099, 0.407] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.282 [0.111, 0.450] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑥  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.224 [0.087, 0.358] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑤  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.347 [0.154, 0.535] 
𝜆 beta (0.3, 0.15) 0.173 [0.126, 0.222] 
𝜂 norm (1.5, 0.25) 1.384 [1.099, 1.648] 
𝜂* norm (1.5, 0.25) 1.171 [0.953, 1.400] 
𝜙𝑎 norm (0.01, 0.001) 0.009 [0.008, 0.010] 
z norm (7.2, 2.5) 7.444 [5.332, 9.986] 
𝜅𝜋 norm (1.5, 0.25) 2.497 [2.283, 2.726] 
𝜌 beta (0.75, 0.1) 0.800 [0.761, 0.836] 
𝜅𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.001 [0.001, 0.001] 
𝜅𝛥𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.078 [0.041, 0.115] 
𝜅𝛥𝛱 norm (0.3, 0.15) 0.327 [0.256, 0.402] 
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Table A2 – Estonia prior and posterior estimates  
Parameter Prior (mean, s.d.) Posterior Mean 90% HPD interval 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑑 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.135 [0.021, 0.242] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑚 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.592 [0.354, 0.814] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑥 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.174 [0.028, 0.301] 
𝜌µ𝑤 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.373 [0.211, 0.540] 
𝜌𝛹 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.119 [0.013, 0.220] 
𝜌𝑎 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.582 [0.389, 0.777] 
𝜌𝑔 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.824 [0.766, 0.882] 
𝜌𝑦∗ beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.899 [0.867, 0.932] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.139 [0.042, 0.228] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖𝑝 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.751 [0.690, 0.824] 
𝜌𝛱 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.233 [0.074, 0.383] 
σ norm (1.5, 0.375) 1.930 [1.399, 2.475] 
𝜑 norm (2, 0.75) 1.963 [1.031, 2.860] 
ℎ beta (0.7, 0.1) 0.886 [0.838, 0.937] 
𝜓 norm (5.5, 0.5) 5.784 [5.021, 6.534] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑑 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.836 [0.797, 0.881] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑚 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.447 [0.314, 0.603] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑥 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.652 [0.546, 0.757] 
𝛾𝑤 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.889 [0.857, 0.922] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.171 [0.057, 0.282] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.287 [0.104, 0.464] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑥  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.267 [0.112, 0.428] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑤  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.288 [0.118, 0.449] 
𝜆 beta (0.3, 0.15) 0.284 [0.224, 0.340] 
𝜂 norm (1.5, 0.25) 1.898 [1.546, 2.246] 
𝜂* norm (1.5, 0.25) 1.259 [0.985, 1.526] 
𝜙𝑎 norm (0.01, 0.005) 0.001 [0.001, 0.001] 
z norm (7.2, 2.5) 8.368 [6.668, 9.999] 
𝜅𝜋 norm (1.5, 0.25) 2.356 [2.175, 2.558] 
𝜌 beta (0.75, 0.1) 0.820 [0.782, 0.855] 
𝜅𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.001 [0.001, 0.001] 
𝜅𝛥𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.001 [0.001, 0.001] 
𝜅𝛥𝛱 norm (0.3, 0.15) 0.294 [0.207, 0.385] 
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Table A3 – Hungary prior and posterior estimates  
Parameter Prior (mean, s.d.) Posterior Mean 90% HPD interval 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑑 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.885 [0.827, 0.948] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑚 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.466 [0.163, 0.729] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑥 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.834 [0.715, 0.939] 
𝜌µ𝑤 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.952 [0.927, 0.976] 
𝜌𝛹 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.903 [0.831, 0.979] 
𝜌𝑎 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.998 [0.998, 0.998] 
𝜌𝑔 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.833 [0.779, 0.893] 
𝜌𝑦∗ beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.907 [0.885, 0.931] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.237 [0.104, 0.361] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖𝑝 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.880 [0.851, 0.910] 
𝜌𝛱 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.198 [0.071, 0.315] 
σ norm (1.5, 0.375) 1.968 [1.397, 2.505] 
𝜑 norm (2, 0.75) 3.294 [2.451, 4.172] 
ℎ beta (0.7, 0.1) 0.870 [0.809, 0.934] 
𝜓 norm (5.5, 0.5) 6.261 [5.500, 7.006] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑑 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.439 [0.347, 0.534] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑚 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.793 [0.716, 0.888] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑥 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.734 [0.664, 0.807] 
𝛾𝑤 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.585 [0.502, 0.665] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.174 [0.052, 0.287] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.677 [0.414, 0.947] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑥  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.177 [0.074, 0.272] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑤  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.586 [0.371, 0.801] 
𝜆 beta (0.3, 0.15) 0.251 [0.187, 0.311] 
𝜂 norm (1.5, 0.25) 1.907 [1.678, 2.110] 
𝜂* norm (1.5, 0.25) 0.609 [0.454, 0.768] 
𝜙𝑎 norm (0.01, 0.001) 0.009 [0.009, 0.010] 
z norm (7.2, 2.5) 6.404 [3.626, 9.290] 
𝜅𝜋 norm (1.5, 0.25) 1.912 [1.582, 2.259] 
𝜌 beta (0.75, 0.1) 0.899 [0.880, 0.922] 
𝜅𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.001 [0.001, 0.001] 
𝜅𝛥𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.032 [0.003, 0.055] 
𝜅𝛥𝛱 norm (0.3, 0.15) 0.091 [0.057, 0.123] 
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Table A4 – Lithuania prior and posterior estimates  
Parameter Prior (mean, s.d.) Posterior Mean 90% HPD interval 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑑 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.134 [0.018, 0.252] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑚 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.833 [0.766, 0.893] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑥 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.860 [0.770, 0.959] 
𝜌µ𝑤 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.419 [0.222, 0.632] 
𝜌𝛹 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.667 [0.349, 0.934] 
𝜌𝑎 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.892 [0.706, 0.989] 
𝜌𝑔 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.791 [0.719, 0.855] 
𝜌𝑦∗ beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.844 [0.793, 0.897] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.094 [0.017, 0.161] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖𝑝 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.732 [0.649, 0.813] 
𝜌𝛱 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.205 [0.080, 0.330] 
σ norm (1.5, 0.375) 1.690 [1.149, 2.210] 
𝜑 norm (2, 0.75) 2.495 [1.625, 3.371] 
ℎ beta (0.7, 0.1) 0.798 [0.731, 0.860] 
𝜓 norm (5.5, 0.5) 5.581 [4.712, 6.387] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑑 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.879 [0.837, 0.925] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑚 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.313 [0.214, 0.423] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑥 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.454 [0.334, 0.582] 
𝛾𝑤 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.835 [0.784, 0.890] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.177 [0.062, 0.286] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.262 [0.080, 0.445] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑥  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.257 [0.092, 0.420] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑤  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.613 [0.397, 0.832] 
𝜆 beta (0.3, 0.15) 0.255 [0.180, 0.331] 
𝜂 norm (1.5, 0.25) 1.002 [0.701, 1.262] 
𝜂* norm (1.5, 0.25) 1.218 [1.218, 1.218] 
𝜙𝑎 norm (0.01, 0.001) 0.009 [0.008, 0.010] 
z norm (7.2, 2.5) 7.126 [4.920, 9.973] 
𝜅𝜋 norm (1.5, 0.25) 2.461 [2.176, 2.737] 
𝜌 beta (0.75, 0.1) 0.861 [0.830, 0.892] 
𝜅𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.028 [0.001, 0.052] 
𝜅𝛥𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.015 [0.001, 0.031] 
𝜅𝛥𝛱 norm (0.3, 0.15) 0.224 [0.153, 0.292] 
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Table A5 – Poland prior and posterior estimates  
Parameter Prior (mean, s.d.) Posterior Mean 90% HPD interval 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑑 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.124 [0.018, 0.222] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑚 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.850 [0.779, 0.921] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑥 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.134 [0.014, 0.250] 
𝜌µ𝑤 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.510 [0.370, 0.657] 
𝜌𝛹 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.841 [0.693, 0.993] 
𝜌𝑎 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.733 [0.633, 0.820] 
𝜌𝑔 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.945 [0.924, 0.965] 
𝜌𝑦∗ beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.930 [0.907, 0.955] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.350 [0.194, 0.493] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖𝑝 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.920 [0.898, 0.943] 
𝜌𝛱 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.192 [0.056, 0.315] 
σ norm (1.5, 0.375) 2.223 [1.737, 2.720] 
𝜑 norm (2, 0.75) 0.250 [0.250, 0.250] 
ℎ beta (0.7, 0.1) 0.867 [0.811, 0.923] 
𝜓 norm (5.5, 0.5) 5.465 [4.705, 6.251] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑑 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.932 [0.915, 0.948] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑚 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.410 [0.273, 0.546] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑥 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.896 [0.840, 0.954] 
𝛾𝑤 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.700 [0.611, 0.790] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.162 [0.059, 0.261] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.234 [0.064, 0.385] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑥  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.161 [0.053, 0.255] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑤  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.508 [0.265, 0.756] 
𝜆 beta (0.3, 0.15) 0.054 [0.040, 0.069] 
𝜂 norm (1.5, 0.25) 2.782 [2.550, 3.088] 
𝜂* norm (1.5, 0.25) 1.457 [1.091, 1.799] 
𝜙𝑎 norm (0.01, 0.001) 0.009 [0.009, 0.010] 
z norm (7.2, 2.5) 9.999 [9.999, 10.00] 
𝜅𝜋 norm (1.5, 0.25) 2.409 [2.110, 2.689] 
𝜌 beta (0.75, 0.1) 0.890 [0.860, 0.918] 
𝜅𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.030 [0.001, 0.058] 
𝜅𝛥𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.029 [0.001, 0.053] 
𝜅𝛥𝛱 norm (0.3, 0.15) 0.165 [0.114, 0.210] 
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Table A6 – Slovakia prior and posterior estimates 
Parameter Prior (mean, s.d.) Posterior Mean 90% HPD interval 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑑 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.115 [0.016, 0.202] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑚 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.228 [0.038, 0.426] 
𝜌µ𝑝𝑥 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.227 [0.043, 0.412] 
𝜌µ𝑤 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.311 [0.121, 0.509] 
𝜌𝛹 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.315 [0.164, 0.450] 
𝜌𝑎 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.764 [0.655, 0.875] 
𝜌𝑔 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.871 [0.817, 0.927] 
𝜌𝑦∗ beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.900 [0.866, 0.934] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.340 [0.153, 0.518] 
𝜌𝑢𝑖𝑝 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.883 [0.841, 0.928] 
𝜌𝛱 beta (0.5, 0.2) 0.116 [0.019, 0.203] 
σ norm (1.5, 0.375) 1.457 [0.894, 1.998] 
𝜑 norm (2, 0.75) 0.250 [0.250, 0.250] 
ℎ beta (0.7, 0.1) 0.786 [0.690, 0.887] 
𝜓 norm (5.5, 0.5) 5.783 [4.951, 6.557] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑑 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.924 [0.901, 0.949] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑚 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.657 [0.535, 0.783] 
𝛾𝑝
𝑥 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.818 [0.738, 0.897] 
𝛾𝑤 beta (0.66, 0.1) 0.939 [0.912, 0.966] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.156 [0.050, 0.258] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.314 [0.112, 0.505] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑥  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.236 [0.082, 0.388] 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑤  beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.359 [0.166, 0.565] 
𝜆 beta (0.3, 0.15) 0.143 [0.096, 0.186] 
𝜂 norm (1.5, 0.25) 2.149 [1.869, 2.448] 
𝜂* norm (1.5, 0.25) 1.226 [0.914, 1.550] 
𝜙𝑎 norm (0.01, 0.0005) 0.010 [0.009, 0.011] 
z norm (7.2, 2.5) 8.035 [6.065, 9.999] 
𝜅𝜋 norm (1.5, 0.25) 1.538 [1.222, 1.877] 
𝜌 beta (0.75, 0.1) 0.855 [0.809, 0.903] 
𝜅𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.168 [0.106, 0.222] 
𝜅𝛥𝑦 norm (0.125, 0.05) 0.082 [0.052, 0.110] 
𝜅𝛥𝛱 norm (0.3, 0.15) 0.080 [0.026, 0.133] 
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Appendix B 
In this section we provide a historical decomposition of the GDP growth to check the 
shocks that have driven the fluctuations of the economy along years for our sample of 
estimated countries. 
It is interesting to analyze the contribution of the various shocks to the booms and busts 
in all the regions considered. In this way we can compare which shocks have mainly 
driven the output growth both in expansions and recessions along our sample. Historical 
decompositions of the output growth are plotted in Figures 1b-6b considering a 
semiannual basis. The black solid line depicts the actual series of the GDP growth, while 
the colored rectangles represent the contribution of each single shock to the output 
growth. In line of principle, each shock can give a positive or negative contribution. By 
"Demand" we label shocks to the public spending and foreign GDP, the label "mark-up" 
groups all the shocks to price and wage mark-up. We further consider in which direction 
monetary policy, capital quality and TFP shocks affect the GDP fluctuations in our sample 
for all countries. 
 
 
Figure B1 – Czech Republic GDP growth historical decomposition 
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Figure B2 – Estonia GDP historical decomposition 
 
 
 
Figure B3 – Hungary GDP historical decomposition 
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Figure B4 – Lithuania GDP historical decomposition 
 
 
Figure B5 – Poland GDP historical decomposition 
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Figure B6 – Slovakia GDP historical decomposition 
 
We begin our investigation from the Czech Republic (Figure 1b). Positive demand 
shocks, associated with positive TFP shocks have driven the growth in the half-mid of 
the ‘2000. The big fall of 2009 was mainly due to negative mark-up shocks, but also 
capital quality and restrictive monetary policy have played some role in the 2009 fall. In 
general, mark-up and demand shocks have usually been opposed. 
A similar path is observed in Estonia (Figure 2b) and Hungary (Figure 3b). In both 
countries negative mark-up and demand shock have driven the big recession of the 
2009. However, in Estonia monetary policy shocks played also an important role during 
the big recession of 1998 triggered by the Russian financial crisis, while in Hungary, 
beyond demand and mark-up shocks, TFP shock often influenced the business cycle 
fluctuations. In Hungary, the 2006 demand driven recession, was mainly due to fiscal 
adjustment package and the EU-approved convergence plan launched after the election 
to cut the budget deficit. 
 
In Lithuania capital quality shocks are estimated to be very important after the 2009 
outbreak, partially offset by positive TFP shocks (see Figure 4b). 
A negative capital quality shock (associated with falling demand) is also the main driving 
force for the polish recession of late 2009-early 2010 (Figure 5b). The following recover 
has been also due to an improvement of the financial conditions. At the beginning of our 
sample, late ’90, the cycle was mainly affected by monetary and demand shocks. 
Finally, by looking at the Slovakia (Figure 6b), we see as it experienced a drastic GDP 
fall since the late 2008, mainly due to a collapse of the demand. This shock was also, 
together with negative mark-up and capital quality shocks, responsible of the 1998 
recession where after election, the new government was obliged to reduce previous 
period excessive government investment for the purposes of debt consolidation. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1 – Resilience indexes: PCA variable loadings 
Recovery 
  
Resistance 
variable  load 
 
variable  load 
σ -0,103 
 
𝑒𝑎 0,044 
𝜑 -0,018 
 
𝑒 0,068 
ℎ 0,578 
 
𝑒𝑔 0,084 
𝜓 0,652 
 
𝑒µ𝑝𝑑  0,057 
𝛾𝑝
𝑑 0,136 
 
𝑒µ𝑝𝑚 0,037 
𝛾𝑝
𝑚 0,089 
 
𝑒µ𝑝𝑥 0,072 
𝛾𝑝
𝑥 0,146 
 
𝑒µ𝑤 0,068 
𝛾𝑤 0,184 
 
𝑒𝛹 0,037 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑  0,152 
 
𝑒𝑦∗ 0,121 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚  0,065 
 
𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑝 0,121 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑥  0,160 
 
𝑒𝛱 0,069 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑤  0,103 
 
𝜌𝑎 0,145 
𝜆 0,290 
 
𝜌𝑔 0,401 
   
𝜌𝑦∗ 0,520 
   
𝜌𝑢𝑖  0,047 
   
𝜌𝑢𝑖𝑝 0,305 
   
𝜌 0,624 
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Table C2 – Non-centered PCA (parameter structure)  
Eigenvalues 
     
 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6 
Eigenvalues 1436,585 4,847 3,301 1,86 1,332 1,039 
Percentage 99,146 0,334 0,228 0,128 0,092 0,072 
Cum. Percentage 99,146 99,48 99,708 99,836 99,928 100 
       PCA variable loadings 
    
 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6 
σ -0,103 0,099 -0,327 0,414 -0,307 -0,274 
𝜑 -0,018 0,316 0,325 0,215 -0,236 0,034 
ℎ 0,578 -0,083 0,129 -0,398 -0,273 0,388 
𝜓 0,652 -0,206 -0,231 0,239 0,078 -0,125 
𝛾𝑝
𝑑 0,136 0,478 0,044 -0,087 -0,084 -0,143 
𝛾𝑝
𝑚 0,089 -0,287 0,041 0,499 -0,175 0,075 
𝛾𝑝
𝑥 0,146 0,065 0,417 0,359 0,16 0,166 
𝛾𝑤 0,184 0,416 -0,285 0,164 -0,017 0,029 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑  0,152 0,084 -0,157 0,014 0,796 -0,118 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚  0,065 -0,421 -0,037 0,194 -0,04 -0,015 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑥  0,16 0,244 -0,486 -0,068 -0,19 0,086 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑤  0,103 -0,22 0,072 -0,312 -0,182 -0,738 
𝜆 0,29 0,246 0,437 0,118 0,028 -0,369 
       PCA case scores 
     
 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6 
Czech Rep. 14,442 0,455 -0,247 0,234 0,992 -0,033 
Hungary 14,789 -1,972 0,057 0,191 -0,01 -0,023 
Estonia 14,491 0,274 -0,54 -0,347 -0,223 0,805 
Lithuania 13,744 0,24 -0,788 -0,677 -0,239 -0,608 
Slovakia 14,155 0,685 -0,03 1,005 -0,488 -0,134 
Poland 14,313 0,382 1,524 -0,422 -0,051 -0,036 
CE 14,323 0,011 -0,001 -0,003 -0,003 -0,005 
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Table C3 – Non-centered PCA (stochastic structure)  
Eigenvalues 
     
 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6 
Eigenvalues 1766,292 5,428 4,089 2,398 1,182 1,114 
Percentage 99,202 0,305 0,23 0,135 0,066 0,063 
Cum. Percentage 99,202 99,507 99,736 99,871 99,937 100 
       PCA variable loadings 
    
 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6 
𝑒𝑎 0,044 -0,354 0,046 0,111 -0,012 -0,423 
𝑒 0,068 0,011 -0,52 0,076 -0,002 0,057 
𝑒𝑔 0,084 -0,176 -0,292 -0,455 0,04 0,257 
𝑒µ𝑝𝑑  0,057 -0,244 -0,205 0,45 -0,085 0,13 
𝑒µ𝑝𝑚 0,037 0,323 0,067 0,058 -0,531 -0,171 
𝑒µ𝑝𝑥 0,072 -0,28 0,191 0,257 0,408 -0,097 
𝑒µ𝑤 0,068 -0,347 0,076 0,264 -0,188 0,134 
𝑒𝛹 0,037 -0,221 -0,23 0,313 -0,209 0,482 
𝑒𝑦∗ 0,121 -0,204 -0,341 0,019 0,149 -0,479 
𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑝 0,121 -0,313 -0,055 -0,341 -0,077 -0,138 
𝑒𝛱 0,069 0,22 -0,353 0,218 -0,191 -0,312 
𝜌𝑎 0,145 0,387 -0,009 0,305 0,358 0,064 
𝜌𝑔 0,401 -0,14 0,172 -0,055 0,121 -0,036 
𝜌𝑦∗ 0,52 -0,025 -0,007 -0,222 -0,195 0,18 
𝜌𝑢𝑖  0,047 -0,152 0,326 0,099 -0,458 -0,166 
𝜌𝑢𝑖𝑝 0,305 0,043 0,336 0,118 0,089 0,161 
𝜌 0,624 0,221 -0,085 0,045 0,021 -0,098 
       PCA case scores 
     
 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6 
Czech Rep. 14,743 0,493 0,166 0,211 0,851 0,436 
Hungary 16,189 1,761 0,537 -0,21 -0,444 -0,006 
Estonia 15,524 -0,678 -0,719 -1,095 -0,145 0,352 
Lithuania 15,605 0,248 -1,429 0,467 0,056 -0,51 
Slovakia 16,267 -0,916 0,281 0,903 -0,449 0,398 
Poland 16,907 -0,85 1,065 -0,277 0,187 -0,617 
CE 15,87 0,009 -0,016 0 0,01 0,008 
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Table C4 – Centered PCA 
Eigenvalues 
    
 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 
Eigenvalues 6.882 5.719 4.274 2.98 2.144 
Percentage 31.282 25.998 19.427 13.547 9.746 
Cum. Percentage 31.282 57.28 76.707 90.254 100 
      PCA variable loadings 
   
 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 
σ 0.024 -0.02 -0.467 0.143 -0.027 
𝜑 0.288 -0.271 -0.005 0 0.063 
ℎ 0.115 0.012 -0.388 -0.188 -0.271 
𝜓 -0.376 0.004 0.063 -0.023 0.062 
𝛾𝑝
𝑑 0.277 0.225 0.112 0.046 -0.238 
𝛾𝑝
𝑚 -0.059 0.295 -0.121 0.309 -0.249 
𝛾𝑝
𝑥 -0.262 -0.116 0.295 -0.012 -0.193 
𝛾𝑤 -0.02 -0.238 0.046 0.471 -0.034 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑑  0.373 0.072 0 0.027 -0.068 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚  -0.116 -0.254 0.273 -0.241 -0.145 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑥  0.179 0.04 -0.1 -0.086 0.573 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑤  0.193 -0.287 0.112 -0.247 -0.129 
𝜓 0.327 -0.023 0.101 0.161 -0.254 
𝜂 -0.062 0.334 -0.237 -0.02 -0.208 
𝜂* -0.374 0.013 -0.072 -0.062 0.039 
𝜙𝑎 0.049 0.197 0.109 0.284 0.468 
z -0.283 0.166 -0.252 -0.049 -0.083 
𝜅𝜋 -0.126 -0.293 -0.271 0.093 0.167 
𝜅𝑦 -0.115 0.277 0.321 -0.096 -0.011 
𝜅𝛥𝑦 -0.052 0.157 0.284 0.405 -0.051 
𝜅𝛥𝛱 -0.156 -0.353 -0.085 0.134 -0.13 
𝜌 -0.035 -0.271 -0.052 0.428 -0.084 
      PCA case scores 
    
 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 
Czech Rep. -0.388 -0.915 0.261 1.38 -0.15 
Estonia -0.343 -0.9 -0.413 -0.802 -0.948 
Hungary 2.335 0.37 -0.252 0.084 -0.013 
Lithuania -0.162 -0.978 0.421 -0.619 1.027 
Slovakia -0.502 1.355 1.369 -0.17 -0.244 
Poland -0.94 1.069 -1.386 0.128 0.328 
 
 
  
 39 
 
References 
An, S. and F. Schorfheide (2007), “Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models,” Econometric 
Reviews, 26(2-4): 113-172. 
Andreasen, Martin M., M. Ferman, and P. Zabczyk (2013), "The Business Cycle 
Implications of Banks' Maturity Transformation", Review of Economic Dynamics, Volume 
16, Issue 4: 581-600  
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1999), “The financial accelerator in a quantitative business 
cycle framework” in Handbook of Macroeconomics, J.B. Taylor and M. Woodford (eds.), 
Amsterdam, Elsevier, Volume 1C: 1341–1393.  
Beqiraj, E., G. Di Bartolomeo, and M. Di Pietro (2016), “Financial crises, limited-asset 
market participation, and banks’ balance sheet constraints,” in Theoretical foundations of 
macroeconomic policy: Growth, productivity, and public finance, G. Di Bartolomeo and E. 
Saltari (eds.), Routledge, London: 57–67.  
Brzoza-Brzezina M., M. Kolasa, and K. Makarski (2015), “Macroprudential policy and 
imbalances in the euro area,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 51: 137-154.  
Carlstrom, C.T. and T.S. Fuerst (1997), “Agency costs, net worth, and business 
fluctuations: A computable general equilibrium analysis,” American Economic Review, 
87: 893–910.  
Christiano, L., R. Motto, and M. Rostagno (2014), “Financial factors in economic 
fluctuations,” American Economic Review, 104: 27–65.  
Christopherson, S., Michie, J., Tyler, P. (2010) Regional resilience: theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 3: 3–10.  
Dedola, L., P. Karadi, and G. Lombardo (2013), “Global implications of national 
unconventional policies,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 60: 66-85.  
Di Bartolomeo G. and E. Marchetti (2004), “Central banks and information provided to 
the private sector,” BNL Quarterly Review, 230: 265-295. 
Didier, T., C. Hevia, S.L. Schmukler (2012), “How resilient and countercyclical were 
emerging economies during the global financial crisis?,” Journal of International Money 
and Finance xxx (2012) 1–26. 
Fernández-Villaverde, J. (2010), “The Econometrics of DSGE Models,” SERIEs Spanish 
Economic Association, 1(1): 3-49. 
Galí J., J. D. López-Salido, and J. Vallés (2007), “Understanding the Effects of 
Government Spending on Consumption,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 
5: 227-270.  
Gertler, M. and P. Karadi (2011), “A model of unconventional monetary policy,” Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 58: 17-34.  
Gertler, M. and P. Karadi (2013), “QE 1 vs. 2 vs. 3...: A framework for analyzing large-
scale asset purchases as a monetary policy tool,” International Journal of Central 
Banking, 9: 5-53.  
Gertler, M. and P. Karadi (2015), “Monetary policy surprises, credit costs, and economic 
activity,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7: 44-76.  
Gertler, M. and N. Kiyotaki (2011), “Financial intermediation and credit policy in business 
cycle analysis,” in B. M. Friedman and M. Woodford (eds.), in Handbook of Monetary 
Economics, vol. 3, Elsevier, Amsterdam: 547-599.  
Geweke, J. (1999), “Using Simulation Methods for Bayesian Econometric Models: 
Inference, Development and Communication,” Econometric Reviews, 18(1): 1-73 
 40 
 
Hudson, R. (2010) Resilient regions in an uncertain world: wishful thinking or practical 
reality? Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 3: 11–26.  
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (1997), “Credit cycles,” Journal of Political Economy, 105: 211-
248.  
Lendvai, J., R. Raciborski, and L. Vogel (2013), “Macroeconomic effects of an equity 
transaction tax in a general-equilibrium model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, 37: 466-482.  
Lubik, T.A. and F. Schorfheide (2006), “A Bayesian Look at New Open Economy 
Macroeconomics,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005, M. Gertler and K. Rogoff eds. 
The MIT Press, Cambridge: 316-366. 
Manca, A.R., P. Benczur and E. Giovannini (2017), “Building a scientific narrative 
towards a more resilient EU society: A conceptual framework,” European Union, 
Publications Office of the European Union: Luxembourg.  
Manca, A.R., P. Benczur and E. Giovannini (2017), “Between policy and practice: A 
conceptual framework for resilience in EU policy making,” JRC Working Papers in 
Economics and Finance.  
Martin, R. (2012), “Regional economic resilience, hysteresis and recessionary shocks,” 
Journal of Economic Geography, 12: 1–32.  
Noy-Meir, I. (1973), “Data transformation in ecological ordination. I: Some advantage of 
non-centering”, Journal of Ecology, vol. 61, pp. 329-41. 
Pendall, R., Foster, K. A., Cowell, M. (2010) Resilience and regions: building 
understanding of the metaphor. Berkeley, institute of urban and regional development. 
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 3: 71–84.  
Rannenberg. A. (2016), “Bank leverage cycles and the external finance premium,” 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 48: 1569–1612. 
Roaf, J., R. Atoyan, B. Joshi, K. Krogulski (2014), 25 Years of Transition Post-Communist 
Europe and the IMF: Regional Economic Issues Special Report, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington DC. 
Siegel, P. B., Alwang, J., Johnson, T. G. (1994) Toward an improved portfolio variance 
measure of regional economic stability. Review of Regional Studies, 24: 71–86.  
Siegel, P. B., Alwang, J., Johnson, T. G. (1995) A structural decomposition of regional 
economic stability: A conceptual framework. Journal of Regional Science, 35: 457–470.  
Siegel, P. B., Johnson, T. G., Alwang, J. (1995) Regional economic diversity and 
diversification. Growth and Change, 26: 261–284.  
Simmie, J., Martin, R. L. (2010) The economic resilience of regions: towards an 
evolutionary approach. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 3: 27–44.  
Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2003), “An Estimated Stochastic Dynamic General Equilibrium 
Model of the Euro Area,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(5): 1123-
1175. 
Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2007), “Shock and Frictions in U.S. Business Cycles: A 
Bayesian DSGE Approach,” American Economic Review, 97(3): 586-606. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
 
 
 
 
 
List of figures 
Figure 1. Growth and recessionary shocks in selected CEB economies, GDP [1997=100] 
(Source IMF)  
Figure 2. Recovery and resistance indexes 
Figure 3. Centered PCA 
Figure 4. Output IRF to a capital quality shock 
Figure 5. Output IRF to a net wealth shock 
Figure B1. Czech Republic GDP growth historical decomposition 
Figure B2. Estonia GDP historical decomposition 
Figure B3. Hungary GDP historical decomposition 
Figure B4. Lithuania GDP historical decomposition 
Figure B5. Poland GDP historical decomposition 
Figure B6. Slovakia GDP historical decomposition 
 
 
 
 
 
  
42 
List of tables 
Table 1. Posterior estimates (structural parameters)  
Table 2. Posterior estimations (stochastic structure)  
Table 3. Output variability: Recovery and resistance 
Table A1. Czech Republic prior and posterior estimates 
Table A2. Estonia prior and posterior estimates  
Table A3. Hungary prior and posterior estimates  
Table A4. Lithuania prior and posterior estimates  
Table A5. Poland prior and posterior estimates  
Table A6. Slovakia prior and posterior estimates 
43 
Annexes 
Annex 1. Appendix A 
Annex 2. Appendix B 
Annex 3. Appendix C 
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: http://europea.eu/contact 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe 
Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
X
X
-N
A
-x
x
x
x
x
-E
N
-N
 
doi:10.2760/19685 
ISBN 978-92-79-77180-4 
K
J-N
A
-2
8
9
6
5
-E
N
-N
 
